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I. INTRODUCTION
The qualitative connection between secrecy of infor-
mation and the ability to maintain quantum correlations
has long been a part of quantum information theory. The
connection comes about from the observation that a max-
imally entangled ebit state, shared between two parties
named Alice and Bob, has no correlations with the “rest
of the universe”—in this sense, the ebit is monogamous
[1]. We can represent the global state of the ebit and the
“rest of the universe” as
ΦAB ⊗ σE ,
where Alice and Bob share the ebit ΦAB , and
ΦAB ≡ |Φ〉 〈Φ|AB ,
|Φ〉AB ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B),
and σE is some state of Eve, a third party representing
the “rest of the universe.” Eve’s state σE is indepen-
dent of Alice and Bob’s ebit. The relation to a secret
key comes about when Alice and Bob perform local mea-
surements of the ebit in the computational basis. The
resulting state is
Φ
AB ⊗ σE ,
where Φ
AB
is the maximally correlated state:
Φ
AB ≡ 1
2
(
|0〉 〈0|A ⊗ |0〉 〈0|B + |1〉 〈1|A ⊗ |1〉 〈1|B
)
.
∗Electronic address: minhsiuh@gmail.com
†Electronic address: mark.m.wilde@saic.com
In this setting, the cryptographic setting, we consider
Eve as a potential eavesdropper. She is no longer the
“rest of the universe,” because some party now holds the
purification of the dephased state Φ
AB
.
The body of literature on the privacy/quantum-
coherence connection has now grown substantially. Some
of the original exploitations of this connection were the
various quantum key distribution protocols [2, 3, 4].
These protocols establish a shared secret key with the
help of a noisy quantum channel or noisy entanglement.
The subsequent proofs [5, 6] for the security of these
protocols rely on the formal mathematical equivalence
between entanglement distillation [7] and key distilla-
tion. Schumacher and Westmoreland explored the con-
nection with an information-theoretical study [8]—they
established a simple relation between the capacity of a
quantum channel for transmitting quantum information
and its utility for quantum key distribution. Collins
and Popescu [9] and Gisin et al. [10] initiated the for-
mal study of the connections between entanglement and
secret key. Since then, researchers have determined a
method for mapping an entangled state to a probability
distribution with secret correlations [11] and have contin-
ued to extend existing quantum results [12] to analogous
results for privacy [13].
The connection has also proven fruitful for quantum
Shannon theory, where we study the capabilities of a
large number of independent uses of a noisy quantum
channel or a large number of copies of a noisy bipartite
state. The first step in this direction was determining
the capacity of a quantum channel for transmitting a pri-
vate message or establishing a shared secret key [14, 15].
Devetak further showed how coherently performing each
step of a private protocol leads to a code that achieves
the capacity of a quantum channel for transmitting quan-
tum information [14]. Since these initial insights, we
have seen how the seemingly different tasks of distilling
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2secret key, distilling entanglement, transmitting private
information, and transmitting quantum information all
have connections [16]. Oppenheim et al. have deter-
mined a merging protocol for private correlations [17],
based on the quantum state merging protocol [18, 19].
Additionally, the secret-key-assisted private capacity of
a quantum channel [20] is analogous to its entanglement-
assisted quantum capacity [21, 22].
The connection is only qualitative because the
Horodeckis and Oppenheim have observed that there ex-
ist bound entangled states [23]. These bound entangled
states are entangled, yet have no distillable entanglement
(one cannot extract ebits from them), but they indeed
have distillable secret key. The dynamic equivalent of
this state is an entanglement binding channel [24, 25, 26].
This channel has no ability to transmit quantum informa-
tion. The loss of the privacy-coherence connection here is
not necessarily discomforting. In fact, it is more interest-
ing because it leads to the “superactivation effect” [27]—
the possibility of combining two zero-capacity channels
to form a quantum channel with non-zero quantum ca-
pacity. Additionally, the private analog of this scenario
exhibits some unexpected behavior [28].
In this paper, we continue along the privacy-coherence
connection and detail the publicly-enhanced private fa-
ther protocol. This protocol exploits a secret key and
a large number of independent uses of a noisy quantum
channel to generate noiseless public communication and
noiseless private communication. This protocol is the
“public-private” analog of the classically-enhanced father
protocol [29], and might lead to further insights into the
privacy-coherence connection. The publicly-enhanced
private father protocol combines the coding techniques of
the suggested protocol in Section 4 of Ref. [30] (originally
proven for the classical wiretap channel [31]) with the re-
cent secret-key-assisted private communication protocol
[20].
We structure this work as follows. The next section
establishes the definition of a noiseless public channel, a
noiseless private channel, noiseless common randomness,
and a perfect secret key. We then clarify a small point
with the protocol for private communication [14, 15]—
specifically, we address the apparent ability of that pro-
tocol to transmit public information in addition to pri-
vate information. Section IV describes the publicly-
enhanced private father protocol and states our main
theorem (Theorem 1). This theorem gives the capacity
region for the publicly-enhanced private father protocol.
We proceed with the proof of the corresponding converse
theorem in Section V and the proof of the corresponding
direct coding theorem in Section VI. Section VII shows
that the suggested protocol from Ref. [30] is a child of
the publicly-enhanced private father protocol. We then
conclude with some remaining open questions.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
We first introduce the notion of a noiseless public chan-
nel, a noiseless private channel, and a noiseless secret
key as resources. Our communication model includes
one sender Alice, a receiver Bob, and an eavesdrop-
per Eve. Alice chooses classical messages k from a set
[K] ≡ {1, . . . ,K}. She encodes these messages as quan-
tum states {|k〉 〈k|A}k∈[K]. We assume that each party
is in a local, secret facility that does not leak informa-
tion to the outside world. For example, Eve cannot gain
any information about a state that Alice or Bob prepares
locally. We consider two dynamic resources, public clas-
sical communicaton and private classical communication,
and two static resources, common randomness and secret
key.
A noiseless public channel idA→Bpub from Alice to Bob
implements the following map for k ∈ [K]:
idA→Bpub : |k〉 〈k|A → |k〉 〈k|B⊗
∑
k′∈[K]
pK′|K (k′|k) ρEk′ , (1)
where pK′|K (k′|k) is some conditional probability distri-
bution and ρEk′ is a state on Eve’s system. The above
definition of a noiseless public channel captures the idea
that Bob receives the classical information perfectly, but
Eve receives only partial information about Alice’s mes-
sage. Eve has perfect correlation with Alice’s message
if and only if her conditional distribution pK′|K (k′|k) is
δk′,k and her states ρEk′ = |k′〉 〈k′|E for all k′. We make no
distinction between a noiseless public channel where Eve
receives partial information and one where Eve receives
perfect information because we are only concerned with
the rate at which Alice can communicate to Bob—we are
not concerned with the more general scenario of broad-
cast communication where Eve is an active party in the
communication protocol [32]. We represent the noiseless
public channel symbolically as the following resource:
[c→ c]pub .
The resource inequality framework [21] uses the nota-
tion [c→ c] to represent one noiseless bit of classical com-
munication. We require a symbol different from [c→ c]
because that symbol does not distinguish between public
and private communication. For example, the superdense
coding protocol [33] actually produces two private clas-
sical bits, but the notation [c→ c] does not indicate this
fact.
A noiseless private channel is the following map:
idA→Bpriv : |k〉 〈k|A → |k〉 〈k|B ⊗ σE ,
where σE is a constant state on Eve’s system, indepen-
dent of what Bob receives. A private channel appears
as a special case of a public channel where random vari-
able K ′ that represents Eve’s knowledge is independent
of random variable K. The definition in (1) reduces to
3that of a private channel if we set the probability dis-
tribution in (1) to pK′|K (k′). But we define a private
channel as the case when K ′ and K are independent.
Otherwise, the channel is public. This difference is the
distinguishing feature of a noiseless private channel. We
represent the noiseless private channel symbolically as
the following resource:
[c→ c]priv .
The above definitions of a public classical channel and
private classical channel are inspired by definitions in
Refs. [20, 34].
Common randomness is the static analog of a noiseless
public channel [35, 36, 37]. In fact, Alice can actually
use a public channel to implement common randomness.
Alice first prepares a local maximally mixed state piA
where
piA ≡ 1|K|
∑
k∈[K]
|k〉 〈k|A .
She makes an exact copy of the random state locally to
produce the following state:
Φ
AA′ ≡ 1|K|
∑
k∈[K]
|k〉 〈k|A ⊗ |k〉 〈k|A′ . (2)
She sends the A′ system through the noiseless public
channel. The resulting state represents common random-
ness shared between Alice and Bob, about which Eve may
have partial information:
1
|K|
∑
k∈[K]
|k〉 〈k|A ⊗ |k〉 〈k|B ⊗
∑
k′∈[K]
pK′|K (k′|k) ρEk′
A noiseless secret key is the static analog of a noiseless
private channel. Alice again prepares the state piA and
makes a copy of it to an A′ system. She sends the A′
system through a noiseless private channel, generating
the following resource:
1
K
∑
k∈[K]
|k〉 〈k|A ⊗ |k〉 〈k|B ⊗ σE = ΦAB ⊗ σE .
Alice and Bob share perfect common randomness, but
this time, Eve has no knowledge of this common ran-
domness. This resource is a secret key. A perfect secret
key resource has two requirements [38]:
1. The key should have a uniform distribution.
2. Eve possesses no correlations with the secret key.
We denote the resource of a shared secret key as fol-
lows:
[cc]priv .
Note that a noiseless public channel alone cannot im-
plement a noiseless private channel, and a noiseless pri-
vate channel alone cannot implement a noiseless public
channel. This relation is different from the correspond-
ing relation between a noiseless quantum channel and a
noiseless classical channel [39] because a noiseless quan-
tum channel alone can implement a noiseless classical
channel, but a noiseless classical channel alone cannot
implement a noiseless quantum channel.
III. RELATIVE RESOURCE IN PRIVATE
COMMUNICATION
We would like to clarify one point with the protocol
for private communication [14, 15] before proceeding to
our main theorem. By inspecting the proof of the di-
rect coding theorem in Ref. [14], one might think that
Alice could actually transmit public information at an
additional rate of I (X;E). The following sentence from
Ref. [14] may lead one to arrive at such a conclusion:
“By construction, Bob can perform a mea-
surement that correctly identifies the pair
(k,m), and hence k, with probability ≥ 1 −
4
√
.”
But this conclusion is incorrect because the random
variable M representing the “public” message m must
have a uniform distribution. This random variable M
serves the purpose of randomizing Eve’s knowledge of the
private message k [40]. The protocol would not operate
as intended if random variableM had a distribution other
than the uniform distribution. The size of the message
set for the random variable M must be at least 2nI(X;E).
The rate I (X;E) of randomization further confirms the
role of the mutual information as the minimum amount of
noise needed to destroy one’s correlations with a random
variable [41] (see Refs. [42, 43] for further explorations
of this idea). It is thus not surprising that the mutual
information I (X;E) arises in the protocol for private
communication because Alice would like to destroy Eve’s
correlations with her private message k.
The resource inequality [21] for the protocol for private
communication is as follows:
〈N〉 ≥ I (X;E) [c→ c : pi]pub +
(I (X;B)− I (X;E)) [c→ c]priv , (3)
where the mutual information quantities are with respect
to the following classical-quantum state:∑
x∈X
pX (x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ UA′→BEN (σA
′
x ),
corresponding to the channel input ensemble
{pX (x) , σA′x }x∈X . The meaning of the resource in-
equality is that Alice can transmit nI (X;E) bits of
4public information (with the requirement that Al-
ice’s random variable has a uniform distribution) and
n (I (X;B)− I (X;E)) bits of private information by
using a large number n of independent uses of the noisy
quantum channel N . The resource [c→ c : pi]pub is not
an absolute resource, but is rather a relative resource
[21, 44, 45], meaning that the protocol only works prop-
erly if Alice’s public variable has a uniform distribution,
or equivalently, is equal to the maximally mixed state
pi. This public information must be completely random
because Alice uses it to randomize Eve’s knowledge of
the private message.
The resource inequality in (3) leads to a simpler way
of implementing the direct coding theorem of the secret-
key-assisted private communication protocol [20]. Sup-
pose that Alice has public information in a random vari-
able M . If she combines this random variable with a
secret key, the resulting random variable has a uniform
distribution because the secret key randomizes the public
variable. This variable can then serve as the input needed
to implement the relative resource of public communica-
tion. Alice can transmit an extra nI (X;E) of private in-
formation by combining this public communication with
the secret key resource, essentially implementing a one-
time pad protocol [46, 47]. We phrase the above argu-
ment with the theory of resource inequalities:
〈N〉+ I (X;E) [cc]priv
≥ I (X;E) [c→ c : pi]pub + I (X;E) [cc]priv +
(I (X;B)− I (X;E)) [c→ c]priv
≥ I (X;E) [c→ c]priv + (I (X;B)− I (X;E)) [c→ c]priv
= I (X;B) [c→ c]priv .
This resource inequality is equivalent to that obtained in
Ref. [20].
IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSMISSION
WITH A SECRET KEY
We begin by defining our publicly-enhanced private fa-
ther protocol (PEPFP) for a quantum channel NA′→B
from a sender Alice to a receiver Bob. The channel has an
extension to an isometry UA
′→BE
N , defined on a bipartite
quantum system BE, where Bob has access to system B
and Eve has access to system E. Alice’s task is to trans-
mit, by some large number n uses of the channel N , one
of K public messages and one of M private messages to
Bob. The goal is for Bob to identify the messages with
high probability and for Eve to receive no information
about the private message. In addition, Alice and Bob
have access to a private string (a secret key), picked uni-
formly at random from the set [S], before the protocol
begins.
An (n,R, P,RS , ) secret-key-assisted private channel
code consists of six steps: preparation, encryption, chan-
nel coding, transmission, channel decoding, and decryp-
tion. We detail each of these steps below.
Preparation. Alice prepares a public message k in a
register K and private message m in a register M . Each
of these has a uniform distribution:
piK ≡ 1
K
K∑
k=1
|k〉 〈k|K ,
piM ≡ 1
M
M∑
m=1
|m〉 〈m|M .
Alice also shares the maximally correlated secret key
state Φ
SASB with Bob:
Φ
SASB ≡ 1
S
S∑
s=1
|s〉 〈s|SA ⊗ |s〉 〈s|SB .
The overall state after preparation is
piK ⊗ piM ⊗ ΦSASB .
Encryption. Alice exploits an encryption map
f : [M ]× [S]→ [M ] .
The encryption map f computes an encrypted variable
f(m, s) that depends on the private message m and the
secret key s. Furthermore, the encryption map f satisfies
the following conditions:
1. For all s1, s2 ∈ [S] where s1 6= s2:
f(m, s1) 6= f(m, s2).
2. For all m1,m2 ∈ [M ] where m1 6= m2:
f(m1, s) 6= f(m2, s).
The encryption map f corresponds physically to a
CPTP map FMSA→P . The state after the encryption
map is
FMSA→P (piK ⊗ piM ⊗ ΦSASB ) =
piK ⊗ 1
MS
∑
m,s
|f (m, s)〉 〈f (m, s)|P ⊗ |s〉 〈s|SB .
Channel Encoding. Alice prepares the codeword
state σA
′n
k,f(m,s) based on the public message k and the
encrypted message f(m, s). This encoding corresponds
physically to some CPTP map EKP→A′n . The state af-
ter the encoding map is
1
KMS
∑
k,m,s
σA
′n
k,f(m,s) ⊗ |s〉 〈s|SB .
Transmission. Alice sends the state σA
′n
k,f(m,s) through
the channel UA
′n→BnEn
N , generating the state
1
KMS
∑
k,m,s
σB
nEn
k,f(m,s) ⊗ |s〉 〈s|SB ,
5where
σB
nEn
k,f(m,s) ≡ UA
′n→BnEn
N (σ
A′n
k,f(m,s)).
Channel Decoding. Bob receives the above state
from the channel and would like to decode the messages.
He exploits a decoding positive-operator-valued measure
(POVM) that acts on his system Bn. The elements of
this POVM are
{ΛBnk,f(m,s)}k∈[K],f(m,s)∈[M ].
Bob places the measurement results k and f (m, s) in the
respective registers Kˆ and Pˆ . The ideal output state
after Bob’s decoding operation is∑
k,m,s
σB
nEn
k,f(m,s)⊗|s〉 〈s|SB⊗|k〉〈k|Kˆ⊗|f (m, s)〉〈f (m, s) |Pˆ ,
where it is understood that the normalization factor is
1/ (KMS).
Decryption. The final step is for Bob to decrypt the
encrypted message f (m, s). He employs a decryption
function g, where
g : [M ]× [S]→ [M ] .
The decryption function g satisfies the following prop-
erty:
∀ s,m g(f(m, s), s) = m.
This decryption function allows Bob to recover Alice’s
private message as m = g(f(m, s), s) based on the en-
crypted message f (m, s) and the secret key s. Physically,
this operation corresponds to a CPTP map GSBPˆ→Mˆ .
The state after this decryption map is
1
KMS
∑
k,m,s
σB
nEn
k,f(m,s) ⊗ |s〉 〈s|SB ⊗ |k〉〈k|Kˆ ⊗ |m〉〈m|Mˆ .
Figure 1 depicts all of the above steps in a general
publicly-enhanced private father code.
The conditions for a good publicly-enhanced secret-
key-assisted private code are that Bob be able to decode
the public message k and encrypted message p = f (m, s)
with high probability:
∀k, p Tr{ΛBnk,pσB
n
k,p} ≥ 1− .
It is sufficient to consider the above criterion because Bob
can determine the private message m with high probabil-
ity if he can determine the encrypted message p with high
probability. Also, the following inequality is our security
criterion:
∀k,m
∥∥∥∥∥∑
s
σE
n
k,f(m,s) ⊗ |s〉 〈s|SB − σE
n
k ⊗ piSB
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ .
(4)
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FIG. 1: The above figure depicts all of the steps in a publicly-
enhanced private father code. Alice performs the encryption
map F on her private variable M and her half SA of the
secret key. She then encodes her public variable K and the
encrypted message with the encoding map E . She transmits
the encoded data over a large number of uses of the noisy
channel N . The isometric extension of the noisy quantum
channel N is UN , and we give the full purification of the
channel to Eve. Bob receives the outputs of the channel. He
performs the decoding map D to recover the public variable
K and the encrypted message. He combines the encrypted
message with his half of the secret key and processes these
two variables with the decryption map G. He then recovers
the private variable M . A good publicly-enhanced private
father code has the property that Bob can perfectly recover
the public variable K and the private variable M while Eve
learns nothing about the secret key or the private variable M .
This criterion ensures that Eve’s state is independent of
the key and the private message m.
A rate triple (R,P,RS) is achievable if there exists
an (n,R − δ, P − δ,RS + δ, ) publicly-enhanced private
father code for any , δ > 0 and sufficiently large n. The
capacity region CPEPFP(N ) is a three-dimensional region
in the (R,P,RS) space with all possible achievable rate
triples (R,P,RS).
Theorem 1 The capacity region C(N ) of a secret-key-
assisted quantum channel N for simultaneously transmit-
ting both public and private classical information is equal
to the following expression:
C(N ) =
∞⋃
l=1
1
l
C(1)(N⊗l), (5)
where the overbar indicates the closure of a set. The
“one-shot” region C(1)(N ) is the set of all R,P,RS ≥ 0,
such that
R ≤ I(X;B)σ, (6)
P ≤ RS + I (Y ;B|X)σ − I (Y ;E|X)σ , (7)
P ≤ I(Y ;B|X)σ. (8)
The above entropic quantities are with respect to a “one-
6shot” quantum state σXYBE, where
σXYBE ≡
∑
x
p(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρY BEx , (9)
and the states ρY BEx are of the form
ρY BEx =
∑
y
p(y|x)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ UA′→BEN (ρA
′
x,y), (10)
for some density operator ρA
′
x,y and U
A′→BE
N is an iso-
metric extension of N . It is sufficient to consider |X | ≤
min{|A′|, |B|}2 + 1 by the method in Ref. [48].
The proof of the above capacity theorem consists of
two parts. The first part that we show is the converse
theorem. The converse theorem shows that the rates in
the above theorem are optimal—any given coding scheme
that has asymptotically good performance cannot per-
form any better than the above rates. We prove the
converse theorem in the next section. The second part
that we prove is the direct coding theorem. The proof
of the direct coding theorem gives a coding scheme that
achieves the limits given in the above theorem.
V. PROOF OF THE CONVERSE THEOREM
We outline the proof strategy of the converse before
delving into its details. Consider that a noiseless public
channel can generate common randomness and a noise-
less private channel can generate a secret key. Let K(N )
denote the capacity of a quantum channel N for generat-
ing common randomness, generating a secret key, while
consuming a secret key at respective rates (R,P,RS).
The capacity region K(N ) contains the capacity region
C(N ) of Theorem 1 (C(N ) ⊆ K(N )) because of the
aforementioned one-way relation between a noiseless pub-
lic channel and common randomness and that between a
noiseless private channel and a secret key. It thus suffices
to prove the converse for a secret-key-assisted common
randomness generation and secret key generation proto-
col. We consider the most general such protocol when
proving the converse and show that the capacity region
in (6-8) bounds the capacity region K(N ). The result
of the converse theorem is then that K(N ) ⊆ C(N ) and
thus that K(N ) = C(N ).
Proof [Converse] Suppose Alice creates the maximally
correlated state piMM
′
A locally, where
Φ
MM ′A ≡ 1
M
M∑
m=1
|m〉 〈m|M ⊗ |m〉 〈m|M ′A .
(the protocol should be able to transmit the correlations
in state Φ
MM ′A with -accuracy while keeping them se-
cret). Alice shares the maximally correlated secret key
state Φ
SASB with Bob:
Φ
SASB ≡ 1
S
S∑
s=1
|s〉 〈s|SA ⊗ |s〉 〈s|SB .
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FIG. 2: The above figure depicts the coding scenario that we
consider for the converse theorem. It is similar to the protocol
of Figure 1 with the exception that the goal is for Alice and
Bob to generate common randomness and a secret key, rather
than transmitting public and private information respectively.
Alice prepares a state Φ
KK′A for common randomness
generation:
Φ
KK′A ≡ 1
K
K∑
k=1
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ |k〉 〈k|K′A .
Alice combines her states Φ
KK′A , Φ
MM ′A , and Φ
SASB .
The most general encoding operation that she can per-
form on her three registers K ′A, M
′
A, and SA is a con-
ditional quantum encoder EK′AM ′ASA→A′n consisting of
a collection {EM ′ASA→A′nk }k of CPTP maps [29]. Each
element EM ′ASA→A′nk of the conditional quantum en-
coder consists of an encryption with the secret key
and the mapping to channel codewords. Each element
EM ′ASA→A′nk produces the following state:
ωMSBA
′n
k ≡ EM
′
ASA→A′n
k (Φ
MM ′A ⊗ ΦSASB ).
The average density operator over all public messages is
then as follows:
1
K
∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ ωMSBA′nk .
Alice sends the A′n system through the noisy channel
UA
′n→BnEn
N , producing the following state:
ωKMSBB
nEn ≡ 1
K
∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗UA′n→BnEnN (ωMSBA
′n
k ).
Define the systems Y ≡ MSB and X ≡ K so that the
above state is a particular nth extension of the state in
the statement of the public-private secret-key-assisted ca-
pacity theorem. The above state is the state at time t
in Figure 2. Bob receives the above state and performs
a decoding instrument DBnSB→K′BM ′B [29] (each element
7DBnSB→M ′Bk of the instrument consists of a channel de-
coding and a decryption). The protocol ends at time tf
(depicted in Figure 2). Let (ω′)KMK
′
BM
′
BE
n
be the state
at time tf after Bob processes ωKMSBB
nEn with the de-
coding instrument DBnSB→K′BM ′B .
Suppose that an (n,R− δ, P − δ,RS + δ, ) secret-key-
assisted protocol as given above exists. In particular, the
following information-theoretic security conditions follow
from the security criterion in (4):
I (M ;En|K)ω ≤ , (11)
I (SB ;En|K)ω ≤ , (12)
by the application of the Alicki-Fannes inequality [49]
and evaluating the conditional mutual informations of
the ideal state σE
n
k ⊗piSB in (4). These conditions imply
that Eve learns nothing about the secret correlations in
system M and Eve learns nothing about the secret key
SB (at time t) even if she knows the public variable K.
We prove that the following bounds apply to the elements
of the protocol’s rate triple (R− δ, P − δ,RS + δ),
R− δ ≤ I(X;B
n)ω
n
, (13)
P − δ ≤ I(Y ;B
n|X)ω
n
, (14)
P − δ ≤ RS + I(Y ;B
n|X)ω − I(Y ;En|X)ω
n
, (15)
RS + δ ≥ I(Y ;E
n|X)ω
n
, (16)
for any , δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n.
In the ideal case, the ideal private channel acts on sys-
tem M to produce the maximally correlated and secret
state piMM
′
. So, for our case, the inequality∥∥∥(ω′)MM ′BEn − ΦMM ′B ⊗ σEn∥∥∥
1
≤  (17)
holds because the protocol is -good for private commu-
nication. The state σE
n
is some constant state on Eve’s
system.
The lower bound in (16) is the most straightforward
to prove. Consider the following chain of inequalities:
n (RS + δ) + 2
≥ I (M ;En|K)ω + I (SB ;En|K)ω +H (SB |K)ω
= H (M |K)ω +H (En|K)−H (MEn|K)ω +
I (SB ;En|K)ω +H (SB |K)ω
≥ H (M |SBK)ω +H (En|SBK)−H (MEn|K)ω +
I (SB ;En|K)ω +H (SB |K)ω
≥ H (M |SBK)ω +H (En|SBK)−H (MEnSB |K)ω +
I (SB ;En|K)ω +H (SB |K)ω
= I (M ;En|SBK)ω + I (SB ;En|K)ω
= I (MSB ;En|K)ω
= I (Y ;En|X)ω
The first inequality follows by combining the equality
n (RS + δ) = H (SB) = H (SB |K) and the security cri-
teria in (11-12). The first equality follows from the defi-
nition of mutual information. The second inequality fol-
lows because H (M)ω = H (M |SBK)ω (M , SB , and K
are independent) and conditioning does not increase en-
tropy H (En|K) ≥ H (En|SBK). The third inequality
follows because the addition of a classical system can in-
crease entropy H (MEn|K)ω ≤ H (MEnSB |K)ω. The
second equality follows from the definition of conditional
mutual information. The third equality follows from the
chain rule of mutual information, and the last equality
follows from the definitions Y ≡MSB and X ≡ K.
We next prove the upper bound in (14) on the private
communication rate:
n(P − δ)
= H (M)
= I (M ;M ′B)ω′ +H (M |M ′B)
≤ I(M ;M ′BK)ω′ + nδ′
≤ I(M ;BnSBK)ω + nδ′
= I(M ;BnK|SB)ω + nδ′
= H (M |SB) +H(BnK|SB)ω−
H (MBnSBK) +H (SB) + nδ′
= H (MSB |K)−H (SB |K) +H(BnK|SB)ω−
H (MBnSBK) +H (SB |K) + nδ′
= H (MSB |K) +H(BnK|SB)ω−
H (MBnSBK) + nδ′
≤ H (MSB |K) +H(BnK)ω −H (MBnSBK) +
H (K)−H (K) + nδ′
= I (MSB ;Bn|K)ω + nδ′
= I (Y ;Bn|X)ω + nδ′
The first equality follows by evaluating the entropy for
the state Φ
M
and noting that H (M) = H (M |K). The
second equality follows by standard entropic relations.
The first inequality follows from (17), Fano’s inequality
[54], and conditioning does not increase entropy. The
second inequality is from quantum data processing. The
third equality follows from the chain rule for mutual in-
formation and I (M ;SB) = 0 because M and SB are
independent. The fourth equality follows by expand-
ing the conditional mutual information. The fifth and
sixth equalities follow from standard entropic relations.
The last inequality follows because conditioning does
not increase entropy H(BnK|SB)ω ≤ H(BnK)ω. The
fifth equality follows by the definition of mutual infor-
mation, and the last equality follows from the definitions
Y ≡MSB , X ≡ K, and δ′ ≡ 1n + P .
The second bound in (15) on the private communica-
tion rate follows from adding the bound in (14) to the
bound in (16).
We can use a proof by contradiction to get the bound
on the public rate R. Suppose that we have secret key
available at some rate > I(X;En)ω/n. Then one could
8combine the public communication at rate R with the
extra secret key in a one-time pad protocol in order to
generate private communication at a rate R + P . The
resulting protocol consumes secret key at a rate greater
than I (Y X;En) because
I (Y ;En|X)ω
n
+
I (X;En)ω
n
=
I (Y X;En)
n
.
The state ω is of the form given by the secret-key-assisted
capacity theorem [20]. The total amount of private
communication that a secret-key-assisted protocol can
generate cannot be any larger than I (Y X;Bn) /n [20].
The chain rule also applies to the mutual information
I (Y X;Bn) /n:
I (Y ;Bn|X)ω
n
+
I (X;Bn)ω
n
=
I (Y X;Bn)
n
.
If the public rate R were to exceed I (X;Bn)ω /n, then
this public rate would contradict the optimality of the
secret-key-assisted protocol from Ref. [20]. Thus, the
public rate R must obey the bound in (13). 2
VI. PROOF OF THE DIRECT CODING
THEOREM
The direct coding theorem is the proof of the follow-
ing publicly-enhanced private father protocol resource in-
equality (See Refs. [21, 22] for the theory of resource in-
equalities):
〈N〉+ I (Y ;E|X)σ [cc]priv ≥
I (Y ;B|X)σ [c→ c]priv + I (X;B)σ [c→ c]pub . (18)
The resource inequality has an interpretation as the fol-
lowing statement. For any , δ > 0 and sufficiently large
n, there exists a protocol that consumes nI (Y ;E|X)σ
bits of secret key and n independent uses of the noisy
quantum channel N to generate nI (Y ;B|X)σ bits of pri-
vate communication and nI (X;B)σ bits of public com-
munication with  probability of error. In addition, Eve’s
state is -close to a state that is independent of the pri-
vate message and the secret key. The entropic quantities
are with respect to the state σXYBE in (9).
The proof of the direct coding theorem proceeds sim-
ilarly to the proof of the direct coding theorem for the
classically-enhanced father protocol from Ref. [29]. There
are some subtle differences between the two proofs, and
we highlight only the parts of the proof that are different
from the proof of the classically-enhanced father proto-
col. The proof begins by showing how to construct a
random private father code, similar to the notion of a
random father code [29] or a random quantum code [14].
We introduce the channel input density operator for a
random private father code and show that it is possi-
ble to make it close to a tensor-product state. We then
show how to associate a classical string to a random pri-
vate father code by exploiting the “code pasting” tech-
nique from Ref. [30]. The proof proceeds by applying the
HSW theorem [50, 51] to show that Bob can decode the
public information first. Based on the public informa-
tion, Bob decodes the private information. The details
of the proof involve showing how the random publicly-
enhanced private father code has low probability of error
for decoding the public information and the private in-
formation. Finally, we employ the standard techniques
of derandomization and expurgation to show that there
exists a particular publicly-enhanced private father code
that achieves the rates given in Theorem 1.
A. Random Private Coding
We first recall the secret-key-assisted private communi-
cation capacity theorem (also known as the private father
capacity theorem) [20].
Theorem 2 The secret-key-assisted private channel ca-
pacity region CSKP(N ) is given by
CSKP(N ) =
∞⋃
l=1
1
l
C˜
(1)
SKP(N⊗l), (19)
where the overbar indicates the closure of a set, and
C˜
(1)
SKP(N ) is the set of all RS ≥ 0, P ≥ 0 such that
P ≤ I(Y ;B)ρ − I(Y ;E)ρ +RS (20)
P ≤ I(Y ;B)ρ, (21)
where RS is the secret key consumption rate and ρ is a
state of the form
ρY BE ≡
∑
y
p(y)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ UA′→BEN (ρA
′
y ), (22)
for some ensemble {p(y), ρA′y } and UA
′→BE
N is an isomet-
ric extension of N .
The channel input density operator ρA
′n
(C) for a pri-
vate father code C ≡ {ρA′nm }m∈[M ] is a uniform mixture
of all the private codewords ρA
′n
m in code C:
ρA
′n
(C) ≡ 1
M
M∑
m=1
ρA
′n
m .
We cannot say much about the channel input density
operator ρA
′n
(C) for a particular private father code C.
But we can say something about the expected channel
input density operator of a random private father code C
(where C itself becomes a random variable).
Definition 1 A random private father code is an ensem-
ble {pC , C} of codes where each code C occurs with prob-
ability pC. The expected channel input density operator
ρA
′n
is as follows:
ρA
′n ≡ EC
{
ρA
′n
(C)
}
. (23)
9A random private father code is “ρ-like” if the expected
channel input density operator is close to a tensor power
of some state ρ: ∥∥∥ρA′n − ρ⊗n∥∥∥
1
≤ . (24)
We now state a version of the direct coding theorem
that applies to random private father codes. The proof
shows that we can produce a random secret-key-assisted
private code with an expected channel input density op-
erator close to a tensor power state.
Proposition 3 For any , δ > 0 and all sufficiently large
n, there exists a random ρA
′
-like secret-key-assisted pri-
vate code for a channel NA′→B such that∥∥∥ρA′n − (ρA′)⊗n∥∥∥
1
≤ 2+ 4 4√, (25)
where ρA
′n
is defined in (23). The random private code
has private communication rate I(Y ;B)ρ − δ and secret
key consumption rate I(Y ;E)ρ + δ. The entropic quan-
tities are with respect to the state in (22) and the state
ρA
′ ≡∑y p (y) ρA′y .
The proof of Proposition 3 is an extension of the devel-
opment in Appendix D of Ref. [30] and the development
in Ref. [20].
Proof Consider the density operator ρA
′
where
ρA
′
=
∑
y∈Y
p (y) ρA
′
y .
The nth extension of the above state as a tensor power
state is as follows:
ρA
′n ≡ (ρA′)⊗n =
∑
yn∈Yn
pn (yn) ρA
′n
yn ,
where
ρA
′n
yn ≡ ρA
′
y1 ⊗ ρA
′
y2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρA
′
yn .
We define the pruned distribution p′n as follows:
p′n (xn) ≡
{
pn (yn) /
∑
yn∈TY nδ p
n (yn) : yn ∈ TY nδ
0 : else,
where TY
n
δ denotes the δ-typical set of sequences with
length n. Let ρ˜A
′n
denote the following “pruned state”:
ρ˜A
′n ≡
∑
yn∈TY nδ
p′n (yn) ρA
′n
yn . (26)
For any  > 0 and sufficiently large n, the state ρA
′n
is
close to ρ˜A
′n
by the gentle measurement lemma [52] and
because the probability for sequences outside the typical
set is small: ∥∥∥ρA′n − ρ˜A′n∥∥∥
1
≤ 2.
For any density operator ρA
′
, it is possible to con-
struct a secret-key-assisted private code that achieves the
private communication rate and secret key consumption
rate in Proposition 3.
Let [M ] denote a set of size 2n[I(Y ;B)−cδ] for some
constant c and let Um denote 2n[I(Y ;B)−cδ] random vari-
ables that we choose according to the pruned distribution
p′n(yn). The realizations um of the random variables Um
are sequences in Yn and are the basis for constructing
a secret-key-assisted private code C with the following
codeword ensemble:
C = {p′n(um), ρAnum}m.
We then perform a decoding positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) with elements {Λm}m∈[M ] and decryp-
tion map g, resulting in failure with probability 4+20
√

by the arguments in Ref. [20].
Suppose that we choose a particular secret-key-assisted
private code C according to the above prescription. Its
code density operator is
ρA
′n
(C) = 1
M
M∑
m=1
ρA
′n
um .
Suppose we now consider the secret-key-assisted pri-
vate code chosen according to the above prescription as a
random code C (where C is now a random variable). Let
ρ′A
′n
(C) be the channel input density operator for the
random code before expurgation and ρA
′n
(C) its channel
input density operator after expurgation:
ρ′A
′n
(C) ≡ 1
M ′
M ′∑
m=1
ρA
′n
Um ,
ρA
′n
(C) ≡ 1
M
M∑
m=1
ρA
′n
Um ,
where the primed rates are the rates before expurgation
and the unprimed rates are those after expurgation (they
are slightly different but identical for large n). Let ρ′A
′n
and ρA
′n
denote the expectation of the above channel
input density operators:
ρ′A
′n ≡ EC
{
ρ′A
′n
(C)
}
,
ρA
′n ≡ EC
{
ρA
′n
(C)
}
.
Choosing our code in the particular way that we did
leads to an interesting consequence. The expectation of
the density operator corresponding to Alice’s codeword
ρA
′n
Um
is equal to the pruned state in (26):
EC
{
ρA
′n
Um
}
=
∑
yn
p′n(yn)ρA
′n
yn ,
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because we choose the codewords ρA
′n
yn randomly accord-
ing to the pruned distribution p′n(yn). Then the ex-
pected channel input density operator ρ′A
′n
is as follows:
ρ′A
′n
= EC
{
ρ′A
′n
(C)
}
(27)
=
1
M ′
M ′∑
m=1
EC
{
ρA
′n
Um
}
(28)
=
∑
yn
p′n(yn)ρA
′n
yn . (29)
Then we know that the following inequality holds for
ρ′A
′n
and the tensor power state ρA
′n
∥∥∥ρ′A′n − ρA′n∥∥∥
1
≤ 2 (30)
by the typical subspace theorem and the gentle measure-
ment lemma. The expurgation of any secret-key-assisted
private code C has a minimal effect on the resulting chan-
nel input density operator [30]:∥∥∥ρ′A′n (C)− ρA′n (C)∥∥∥
1
≤ 4 4√.
The above inequality implies that the following one holds
for the expected channel input density operators ρ′A
′n
and ρA
′n
∥∥∥ρ′A′n − ρA′n∥∥∥
1
≤ 4 4√, (31)
because the trace distance is convex. The following in-
equality holds ∥∥∥ρA′n − ρA′n∥∥∥
1
≤ 2+ 4 4√ (32)
by applying the triangle inequality to (30) and (31).
Therefore, the random secret-key-assisted private code
is ρ-like. 2
B. Associating a Random Private Code with a
Classical String
Suppose that we have an ensemble {p(x), ρx}x∈X
of quantum states. The density operator ρx arises
as the expected density operator of another ensemble
{p (y|x) , ρx,y}. Let xn ≡ x1 · · ·xn denote a classical
string generated by the density p(x) where each symbol
xi ∈ X . Then there is a density operator σxn correspond-
ing to the string xn where
ρxn ≡
n⊗
i=1
ρxi .
Suppose that we label a random private code by the
string xn and let ρA
′n
xn denote its expected channel input
density operator.
Definition 2 A random private code is (ρxn)-like if the
expected channel input density operator ρA
′n
xn is close to
the state ρxn : ∥∥∥ρA′nxn − ρxn∥∥∥
1
≤ .
Proposition 4 Suppose we have an ensemble as above.
Consider a quantum channel NA′→B with its isomet-
ric extension UA
′→BE
N . Then there exists a random
(ρxn)-like secret-key-assisted private code for the channel
NA′→B for any , δ > 0, for all sufficiently large n, and
for any classical string xn in the typical set TX
n
δ [54]. Its
private communication rate is I(Y ;B|X) − c′δ, and its
secret key consumption rate is I(Y ;E|X)− c′′δ for some
constants c′, c′′ where the entropic quantities are with re-
spect to the state in (9). The state ρx is the restriction
of the following state
ρY A
′
x =
∑
y
p(y|x)|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρA′x,y
to the A′ system.
Proof [Proposition 4] The proof of this theorem pro-
ceeds exactly as the proof of Proposition 3 in Ref. [29]
and the proof of Proposition 5 in Ref. [30]. 2
C. Publicly-enhanced secret-key-assisted private
code
Proposition 5 (HSW Coding Theorem [50, 51])
Consider an input ensemble {p(x), ρA′x } that gives rise
to a classical-quantum state σXB, where
σXB ≡
∑
x∈X
p(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗NA′→B(ρA′x ).
Let R = I(X;B)σ − c′δ for any δ > 0 and for some
constant c′. Then for all  > 0 and for all sufficiently
large n, there exists a classical encoding map
h :
[
2nR
]→ TXnδ ,
and a decoding POVM
{ΛBnk }k∈[2nR],
that allows Bob to decode any classical message k ∈ [2nR]
with high probability:
Tr{τBnk ΛB
n
k } ≥ 1− .
The density operators τB
n
k are the channel outputs
τB
n
k ≡ NA
′n→Bn(ρA
′n
h(k)), (33)
and the channel input states ρA
′n
xn are a tensor product of
states in the ensemble:
ρA
′n
xn ≡
n⊗
i=1
ρA
′
xi .
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We are now in a position to prove the direct coding part
of the publicly-enhanced private father capacity theorem.
The proof is similar to that in Ref. [29, 30].
Proof [Direct Coding Theorem] Define the public
message set [2nR], the classical encoding map h, the
channel output states τB
n
k , and the decoding POVM
{ΛBnk }k∈2nR as in Proposition 5. We label each public
message k ∈ [2nR] where R = I(X;B)− c′δ.
Invoking Proposition 4, there exists a random (ρA
′n
h(k))-
like private code Ck with probability density pCk because
each input to the channel ρA
′n
h(k) is a tensor product of
an ensemble {p(x), ρA′x }. The random private code Ck
has encryption-decryption pair (fCk , gCk) and encoding-
decoding pair (ECk ,DCk) for each of its realizations.
We label the combined operations simply as the pair
(EMSA→A′nCk ,DB
nSB→M
Ck ). It transmits n[I(Y ;B|X)+c′δ]
private bits, provided Alice and Bob share at least
n[I(Y ;E|X) + c′′δ] secret key bits.
Let C denote the random publicly-enhanced secret-key-
assisted private code that is the collection of random pri-
vate codes {Ck}k∈[2nR]. We first prove that the expec-
tation of the error probability for public message k is
small. The expectation is with respect to the random
private code Ck. Let τBnCk denote the channel output den-
sity operator corresponding to the private code Ck:
τB
n
Ck ≡ TrSB
{
NA′n→Bn(EMSA→A′nCk (piM ⊗ Φ
SASB ))
}
.
Let τB
n
k denote the expected channel output density op-
erator of the random father code Ck:
τB
n
k ≡ ECk
{
τB
n
Ck
}
=
∑
Ck
pCkτ
Bn
Ck .
The following inequality holds∥∥∥ρA′nh(k) − ρA′nh(k)∥∥∥
1
≤ |X | 
because the random private code Ck is (ρA′nh(k))-like. Then
the expected channel output density operator τB
n
k is close
to the tensor product state τB
n
k in (33):∥∥∥τBnk − τBnk ∥∥∥
1
≤ |X | , (34)
because the trace distance is monotone under the quan-
tum operation NA′n→Bn . It then follows that the POVM
element ΛB
n
k has a high probability of detecting the ex-
pected channel output density operator τB
n
k :
Tr{ΛBnk τB
n
k } ≥ Tr{ΛB
n
k τ
Bn
k } −
∥∥∥τBnk − τBnk ∥∥∥
1
≥ 1− − |X | . (35)
The first inequality follows from the following lemma that
holds for any two quantum states ρ and σ and a positive
operator Π where 0 ≤ Π ≤ I:
Tr {Πρ} ≥ Tr {Πσ} − ‖ρ− σ‖1 .
The second inequality follows from Proposition 5 and
(34). Let pe,pub(Ck) denote the public message error
probability for each public message k of the publicly-
enhanced father code C:
pe,pub(Ck) ≡ 1− Pr{K ′ = k | K = k}.
Then by the above definition, and (35), it holds that the
expectation of the error probability pe,pub(Ck) for public
message k with respect to the random private code Ck is
low:
ECk {pe,pub(Ck)} = 1− Tr{ΛB
n
k τ
Bn
k } (36)
≤ (1 + |X |) . (37)
We now show that the private error is small. Input the
state piM⊗ΦSASB to the encoder EMSA→A′nCk , followed by
the channelNA′n→Bn . The resulting state is an extension
ΩSBB
n
Ck of τ
Bn
Ck :
ΩSBB
n
Ck ≡ NA
′n→Bn
(
EMSA→A′nCk (piM ⊗ Φ
SASB )
)
.
Let Ω
SBB
n
k denote the expectation of Ω
SBB
n
Ck with respect
to the random code Ck:
Ω
SBB
n
k ≡ ECk
{
ΩSBB
n
Ck
}
.
It follows that Ω
SBB
n
k is an extension of τ
Bn
k . The fol-
lowing inequality follows from (35):
Tr{ΩSBB
n
k Λ
Bn
k } ≥ 1− (1 + |X |). (38)
The above inequality is then sufficient for us to apply a
modified version of the gentle measurement lemma (See
Appendix C of Ref. [29]) so that the following inequality
holds
ECk
{∥∥∥∥√ΛBnk ΩSBBnCk √ΛBnk − ΩSBBnCk ∥∥∥∥
1
}
≤
√
8(1 + |X |). (39)
We define a decoding instrument DBnSB→KMC for the
random publicly-enhanced private father code C as fol-
lows [29, 55]:
DBnSB→KMC
(
ρB
nSB
)
≡
∑
k
DBnSB→MCk
(√
ΛBnk ρ
BnSB
√
ΛBnk
)
⊗ |k〉 〈k|K ,
where DBnSB→MCk is the decoder for the private father
code Ck and each map DB
nSB→M
Ck (
√
ΛBnk ρ
BnSB
√
ΛBnk )
is trace-reducing. The induced quantum operation cor-
responding to this instrument is as follows:
DBnSB→MC (ρ) = TrK
{
DBnSB→KMC (ρ)
}
.
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Monotonicity of the trace distance gives an inequality for
the trace-reducing maps of the quantum decoding instru-
ment:
ECk

∥∥∥∥∥∥ D
BnSB→M
Ck
(√
ΛBnk Ω
SBB
n
Ck
√
ΛBnk
)
−
DBnSB→MCk
(
ΩSBB
n
Ck
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1

≤
√
8(1 + |X |). (40)
The following inequality also holds
ECk

∥∥∥∥∥∥
DBnSB→MC
(
ΩSBB
n
Ck
)
−
DBnSB→MCk
(√
ΛBnk Ω
SBB
n
Ck
√
ΛBnk
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1

≤ ECk
∑
k′ 6=k
∥∥∥∥DBnSB→MCk′
(√
ΛBnk′ Ω
SBB
n
Ck
√
ΛBnk′
)∥∥∥∥
1

= ECk
∑
k′ 6=k
∥∥∥∥√ΛBnk′ ΩSBBnCk √ΛBnk′ ∥∥∥∥
1

= ECk
∑
k′ 6=k
Tr
{
ΛB
n
k′ Ω
SBB
n
Ck
}
= 1− Tr
{
ΛB
n
k Ω
SBB
n
k
}
≤ (1 + |X |). (41)
The first inequality follows by definitions and the triangle
inequality. The first equality follows because the trace
distance is invariant under isometry. The second equality
follows because the operator ΛB
n
k Ω
SBB
n
Ck is positive. The
third equality follows from some algebra, and the second
inequality follows from (35). The private communication
for all public messages k and codes Ck is good∥∥∥DBnSB→MCk (ΩSBBnCk )− piM∥∥∥1 ≤ ,
because each code Ck in the random private father code
is good for private communication. It then follows that
ECk
{∥∥∥DBnSB→MCk (ΩSBBnCk )− piM∥∥∥1} ≤ . (42)
Application of the triangle inequality to (42), (41), and
(40) gives the following bound on the expected private
error probability:
ECk {pe,priv (Ck)} ≤ ′ (43)
where
′ ≡ (1 + |X |)+
√
8(1 + |X |)+ 2√,
and where we define the private error pe,priv (Ck) of the
code Ck as follows:
pe,priv (Ck) ≡
∥∥∥DSB→MC (ΩSBBnCk )− piM∥∥∥1 .
The above random publicly-enhanced secret-key-
assisted private code relies on Alice and Bob having ac-
cess to a source of common randomness. We now show
that they can eliminate the need for common randomness
and select a good publicly-enhanced secret-key-assisted
private code C that has a low public error pe,pub(Ck) and
low private error pe,priv(Ck) for all public messages in a
large subset of [2nR]. By the bounds in (36) and (43), the
following bound holds for the expectation of the averaged
summed error probabilities:
ECk
{
1
2nR
∑
k
pe,pub(Ck) + pe,priv(Ck)
}
≤ ′ + (1 + |X |).
If the above bound holds for the expectation over all
random codes, it follows that there exists a particular
publicly-enhanced private father code C = {Ck}k∈[2nR]
with the following bound on its averaged summed error
probabilities:
1
2nR
∑
k
pe,pub(Ck) + pe,priv(Ck) ≤ ′ + (1 + |X |).
We fix the code C and expurgate the worst half of the pri-
vate father codes—those private father codes with public
messages k that have the highest value of pe,pub(Ck) +
pe,priv(Ck). This derandomization and expurgation yields
a publicly-enhanced private father code that has each
public error pe,pub(Ck) and each private error pe,priv(Ck)
upper bounded by 2 (′ + (1 + |X |)) for the remaining
public messages k. This expurgation decreases the pub-
lic rate by a negligible factor of 1n . 2
VII. CHILD PROTOCOLS
Two simple protocols for the public-private setting are
secret key distribution and the one-time pad [46, 47]. Se-
cret key distribution is a protocol where Alice creates
the state Φ
AA′
locally and sends the system A′ through
a noiseless private channel. The protocol creates a secret
key and corresponds to the following resource inequality:
[c→ c]priv ≥ [cc]priv .
The one-time pad protocol exploits a secret key and a
noiseless public channel to create a noiseless private chan-
nel. It admits the following resource inequality:
[c→ c]pub + [cc]priv ≥ [c→ c]priv .
We now consider some protocols that are child pro-
tocols of the publicly-enhanced private father protocol.
Consider the resource inequality in (18). We can com-
bine the protocol with secret key distribution, and we
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recover the protocol suggested in Section 4 of Ref. [30]:
〈N〉+ I (Y ;E|X)σ [cc]priv
≥ I (Y ;B|X)σ [c→ c]priv + I (X;B)σ [c→ c]pub .
≥ (I (Y ;B|X)σ − I (Y ;E|X)σ) [c→ c]priv +
I (Y ;E|X)σ [c→ c]priv + I (X;B)σ [c→ c]pub
≥ (I (Y ;B|X)σ − I (Y ;E|X)σ) [c→ c]priv +
I (Y ;E|X)σ [cc]priv + I (X;B)σ [c→ c]pub
By cancellation of the secret key term, we are left with
the following resource inequality:
〈N〉+ o [cc]priv ≥ (I (Y ;B|X)σ − I (Y ;E|X)σ) [c→ c]priv
+ I (X;B)σ [c→ c]pub ,
where o [cc]priv represents a sublinear amount of secret
key consumption.
We can combine the publicly-enhanced private father
protocol with the one-time pad:
〈N〉+ I (Y ;E|X)σ [cc]priv + I (X;B)σ [cc]priv
≥ I (Y ;B|X)σ [c→ c]priv + I (X;B)σ [c→ c]pub
+ I (X;B)σ [cc]priv (44)
≥ I (Y ;B|X)σ [c→ c]priv + I (X;B)σ [c→ c]priv
= I (XY ;B)σ [c→ c]priv (45)
This protocol is one for secret-key-assisted transmission
of private information. It is not an efficient protocol be-
cause the optimal secret-key-assisted protocol [20] imple-
ments the following resource inequality:
〈N〉+ I (XY ;E)σ [cc]priv ≥ I (XY ;B)σ [c→ c]priv
For a channel with non-zero private capacity so that
I (X;B)σ − I (X;E)σ > 0, the protocol in (45) is not
efficient because it uses more secret key than necessary.
This inefficiency is similar to the inefficiency that we
found for combining the classically-enhanced father pro-
tocol with teleportation (See Section VII of Ref. [29]). It
is not surprising that this inefficiency occurs because the
publicly-enhanced private father protocol is the public-
private analog of the classically-enhanced father protocol
and the one-time pad protocol is the public-private ana-
log of the teleportation protocol [9].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced an optimal protocol, the publicly-
enhanced private father protocol, that exploits a secret
key and a large number of independent uses of a noisy
quantum to transmit public and private information.
Several protocols in the literature are now special cases
of this protocol.
A few open questions remain. It remains to determine
the capacity regions of a multiple-access quantum chan-
nel [48, 56] and a broadcast channel [32] for transmitting
public and private information while consuming a secret
key. One might also consider the five-dimensional re-
gion corresponding to the scenario where Alice and Bob
consume secret key, entanglement, and a noisy quan-
tum channel to produce quantum communication, public
classical communication, and private classical communi-
cation. This scenario might give more insight into the
privacy/coherence correspondence. It remains open to
determine the full triple trade-off for the use of a quan-
tum channel in connection with public communication,
private communication, and secret. We have made initial
progress on this problem by exploiting techniques devel-
oped in Ref. [39]. Before completing this work, we need
to determine a publicly-assisted private mother proto-
col, the analog of the classically-assisted mother protocol
in Refs. [21, 39]. This protocol should then allow us to
determine the full triple trade-off for both the dynamic
setting and the static setting.
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